




FRUIT-TREE AND THE ORDINARY INCOME BASE
by Marvin A. Chirelstein*
The distinction between capital gain and ordinary income is
one of the great complicating features of the federal income tax. In
broad terms, it can be said that capital gains are gains that result
from sales of investment property-typically, securities and real
estate-and that ordinary income consists chiefly of wages and
salaries, business profits, and dividends, interest and rents. But
while the main categories are thus familiar, the application of the
capital-ordinary distinction in less conventional cases is often prob-
lematic, and borderline definitional issues, though inevitable, are
generally agreed to be too numerous for comfort.' The fault, at the
first level, lies with the statute itself. Although Code § 1221 makes
some effort to state what qualifies as a "capital asset," the classifica-
tion scheme is incomplete and in the end relies too heavily on am-
biguous terms like "property" and "business." At another level,
this failing probably reflects a fundamental uncertainty on the part
of Congress itself about what it really meant to achieve by ex-
empting2 a major fraction of long-term investment gains from the
ordinary tax base.
The statute's well-known incompleteness in the matter of defi-
nition has made it necessary for the courts to develop common-law
doctrines to deal with uncertain cases, and the history of the capi-
tal asset concept is in large part a story of judicial ingenuity in
creating doctrinal limits on the scope of the capital gain preference.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. A.B., University
of California; J.D., University of Chicago.
1. Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gain Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REV.
985 (1956).
2. I.R.C. §1202 provides that a taxpayer, other than a corporation, shall deduct
60% of net long-term capital gain from gross income.
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One such judicially developed limitation-the carved-out interest
rule-is the subject of this brief article. The rule traces back to the
Supreme Court's decisions in Hort,3 Lake,4 Earl,5 and other early
cases in which the familiar fruit-and-tree distinction was deemed
critical, but the scope of the rule and its roots in capital gain policy
have never been entirely clear. 6 To be sure, there is not the same
urgency about the matter now as there was in 1969 when Congress
acted to resolve the tax treatment of mineral production payments
and sales of life estates, two areas in which ill-advised judicial deci-
sions had created a considerable risk of tax avoidance. But even
with those risks past, I think there may still be some illumination
in sorting through the issues and in attempting to say precisely
what the carved-out interest rule is all about.
7
This done, my hope is that the analysis will throw light on a
particular area; namely, the treatment of lease and loan termination
payments. Here, as much as anywhere in the law of capital gain,
the uncertainty surrounding capital gain policy has generated
puzzling and inconsistent results. The Supreme Court's decisions
in Hort v. Commissioner8 and in U.S. v. Kirby Lumber Co. 9 have
long dominated the field, but neither is a very splendid instance of
tax-opinion writing. My own view, indeed, is that erroneous infer-
ences have been drawn from each, with unfortunate consequences
for the administration of the capital gain tax.
I. THE ORDINARY TAX BASE
The capital gain-ordinary income distinction is usually ap-
proached in terms of the relationship between the property dis-
posed of and the individual involved in the exchange. If, for exam-
ple, the "property" consists of personal services-an exchange of
time and effort for cash-the receipt is plainly ordinary income.
This is so because "services" and "capital assets" are deemed to oc-
cupy separate tax universes, and it is well understood that the re-
turn to personal efforts is ordinary. The same is true of stock-in-
trade. Property held for sale to customers-business inventory-is
3. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
4. Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
5. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
6. For a recent discussion, see Joyce & Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA
Transactions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income
Interests, 31 TAX L. REV. 121 (1976).
7. See Section II infra.
8. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
9. 384 U.S. 1 (1931).
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obviously non-capital; hence, if the taxpayer is a "dealer" with re-
spect to the property his gains are taxable at ordinary rates.10 By
familiar definition, then, both services and stock-in-trade are out-
side the class of capital asset, and once identified as such the issue
of ordinary income or capital gain is instantly resolved.
Investment property presents a different, and to some extent a
closer question. Here, the issue relates not to the character of the
property held-concededly capital-but to whether capital gain (or
loss) is consistent with the necessary assumptions that define the
ordinary income base. Two such assumptions-one positive, so to
speak, the other negative--can be cited as fundamental. The posi-
tive assumption is that a tax at ordinary rates shall be imposed on
the net yield from investment in land, buildings, machinery and
other productive capital assets. For this purpose, "net yield" refers
to gross revenues from the lease or operation of the property, re-
duced by (i) current expenses such as wages and salaries and (ii)
depreciation. There is wide agreement, I think, that depreciation is
overstated in the early years of an asset's useful life under any of
the currently permissible methods of cost-allocation-so that, in
general, taxable income is deferred from the earlier to the later
years of use-but there appears to be no practical way by which an
accurate scheme of calculating cost-recovery can be imposed and
certainly no impulse on Congress' part to try to find one. Ac-
cepting that, "net yield" means revenues less the sum of current
expenses and depreciation as specially defined for tax purposes;
and this, together with business profits and personal service in-
come, makes up the ordinary tax base for all practical purposes.
What I have described, of course, is simply the annual or peri-
odic return to the owners of the firm-to those who hold financial
assets such as stocks and bonds. In many instances, these financial
asset-holders will have created a structure of priorities among
themselves to reflect their varying preferences for risk-with bond-
holders coming ahead of preferred stockholders, and the latter
coming ahead of the common-but such private arrangements are
of no special interest to the individual income tax. However split
among the investors, it is the overall return on the capital invested
in the enterprise that is the object of the ordinary income tax. If,
for example, all tangible assets of a certain class-say office
buildings--currently return 12% on investment taken at market
10. I.R.C. § 1221(1).
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value, then it is this 12% return that must be taxed at ordinary
rates. Viewed "nationally," ordinary income must embrace the en-
tire return to security-holders; there is a "deficiency" if the includ-
able amount is less.
In contrast-and as a second assumption-the law anticipates
that changes in the value of an expected income stream will, if re-
alized, be taxed as capital gain. Thus, if anticipated earnings in-
crease, whether because of an increase in demand for the firm's
product or a decline in current operating expenses, the value of
the property from which such earnings derive (still discounted at
the 12% rate) will necessarily rise as well. Similarly, if anticipated
earnings are unchanged but the applicable discount rate drops from
12% to 10%-whether because the firm is viewed as less risky than
formerly or because the time-value of money has declined-the
value of the firm's productive assets will go up. In either event,
the rise in value, if realized through sale, is the proper and in-
tended subject of the capital gain preference. In the first case
-where anticipated earnings increase but the discount rate of 12%
is unchanged-the Code "wants" to tax at ordinary rates only a
12% return. The adjustment in value of the income stream is
therefore conceded to the capital gain preference, while the buyer
of the property takes up a higher depreciable basis which yields
him the 12% return. In the second case-where earnings are
unchanged but the discount rate drops from 12% to 10%-the
Code "wants" to impose the ordinary tax on no more than the new
10% return, and again, the adjustment in present value, if realized,
is capital gain with a stepped-up basis to the purchaser. If market
value changes were simply credited to the owners of depreciable
property, with bases adjusted correspondingly, precisely these
would be the outcomes on a year-to-year basis. Under our system
of accounting, however, a realization through sale is required be-
fore gain can be recognized and a new basis for the property can
be established. The ordinary income base therefore will be "over-
stated" until the underlying tangible asset is passed on to a new
user at the higher depreciable value. A realization is needed to
"correct" the base, but once it occurs and a capital gain is imposed
on the seller the tax base will be properly reoriented.
At all events, the scope, but also the limit, of capital gain
treatment should be evident. The tax law must collect an ordinary
tax on the net yield from investment in tangible assets. No rule or
combination of rules should be tolerated which converts net yield
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into capital gain. By the same token, however, no rule is needed,
and none is appropriate, which treats (realized) changes in the mar-
ket value of the anticipated income stream as ordinary income.
All this is well known (especially to real estate investors), but
it is worth repeating in the present context because it shows very
clearly what the carved-out interest rule ought to achieve. In ef-
fect, the rule should operate to protect the ordinary income base
by assuring that the net yield on tangible property investment will
always be subject to the regular tax rates. If it does less than that,
it needs extension; if more, restriction. In practice, it has done
both more and less, and it is this circumstance that has made it, on
occasion, a doctrine of confusion.
II. THE CARVED-OUT INTEREST RULE
The carved-out interest rule itself can be restated quickly.
Judging from Hort, Lake, and other decisions, the rule imposes a
twofold limitation on the owners of capital assets. Where a term in-
terest in property is sold, but a reversion to take effect after the
term expires is retained by the seller, the carved-out interest rule
(a) denies the seller an offsetting basis for the interest sold and re-
quires that the entire amount received be included in income, and
(b) treats that income as ordinary. By obvious contrast, a sale of the
"underlying property" entitles the seller to offset his basis against
the proceeds of sale and to treat the gain, if any, as capital gain.
It is easy to see why the carved-out interest rule plays a role
in respect to financial assets-stocks, bonds-that is not merely
important, but absolutely indispensable to the revenues. Assume
that S, an investor, purchases 100 shares of stock for $1,000 in the
expectation of an annual dividend of $80. Suppose he sells to V, a
vendee, the right to receive the dividend for the next 5 years. The
sale price is $320, which represents the present value of $80 a year
for 5 years discounted at 8%. Can S offset an equivalent proportion
of his basis, i.e., $320, against the receipt and hence report no
gain? The answer-on which everyone agrees-is that he must re-
port the full $320 as income, and as ordinary income at that. The
explanation usually given 1 -and quite correct as far as it goes-is
that permission to offset basis against the sale proceeds would per-
mit S both to defer the recognition of income indefinitely-that is,
until the stock is finally sold-and to convert his ordinary dividend
11. ALI DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS IN CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 273-74 (1960).
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income into capital gain. Thus, if a basis offset of $320 were al-
lowed, no gain would be recognized in Year 1 when the dividend
right was disposed of, and S's basis for his stock would be reduced
from $1,000 to $680. Assuming the stock is still worth $1,000 at the
end of Year 5 when the carved-out dividend expires, S could sell
his shares outright and recognize a $320 capital gain. This would
follow even though the stock had not changed in value between
Year 1 and Year 5 and the entire positive return was attributable to
the dividends paid during that 5-year period. The same routine
could of course be repeated until S's basis for his shares was ex-
hausted, or, indeed, perpetually. It seems plain, however, that S is
actually receiving "dividends"-even though at 5-year rather than
1-year intervals-and almost everyone, I think, would say that the
mere act of anticipatory disposition ought not to alter the ordinary
treatment that customarily attaches to a dividend receipt. 12 This,
presumably, is what the Supreme Court had in mind in the Hort
case when it characterized the receipt of commuted rentals as "a
substitute for future income" taxable at ordinary rates.
But while adequate, the explanation just given is not com-
plete. What it lacks is a description of the tax status of V, the
vendee of the 5-year dividend right. If, for example, V were re-
quired to include each annual $80 dividend in income without an
offsetting amortization deduction, no very urgent reason would ex-
ist (indeed, it would be anomalous) to treat the $320 payment re-
ceived by S as ordinary income. No more (but no less) than $400 of
dividends should be taxed in respect to the stock over the 5-year
period, but there is no particular reason to tax that amount to one
taxpayer rather than the other. One knows, however, that V, being
the purchaser of a wasting asset, is entitled to recover his $320 in-
vestment through annual amortization allowances, 13 and it is really
this rule that has to be regarded as fixed. The result is that V de-
ducts $64 a year ($320/5) and includes in income only the net
amount of $16, a total of $80 over the 5-year term. Once this is
seen, the treatment of S follows mechanically. Doctrinal argument
is in a sense irrelevant, because the Treasury simply must have
$400 of ordinary income in total. The effect is, of course, very dif-
ferent if S sells V the stock itself, or even one share out of the
12. The assignment of the right to receive a future dividend has been held not
to alter the character of the amount received. See, e.g., Rhodes' Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 131 F.2d 50, 30 A.F.T.R. 220, affg 43 B.T.A. 780 (6th Cir. 1942).
13. I.R.C. § 167.
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100-share lot, because then V's investment (like S's before him) is
non-amortizable. Hence, there is obviously no objection to S's
offsetting his basis against the proceeds of sale: it is V who will an-
nually report the full $80 of dividend income in the future.
Putting the whole matter briefly: we cannot (without irrepara-
ble harm to the revenues) allow an investor to carve an amortizable
interest out of a perpetuity unless the proceeds are fully recog-
nized to the seller and taxed at ordinary rates.
The carved-out interest rule achieves the result just stated,
but it is not the only way of doing so, and is probably not the best
way. An alternative--one that is reflected in Code § 636, but there
confined to mineral properties-would be to recharacterize the
carving out as a loan, i.e., from "vendee" to stockowner, and then
treat the annual dividends as repayment of principal. Since the
stockholder's debt obligation is thus being satisfied, each yearly
dividend would be regarded as applied for his benefit and would
be taxed to him when received by the (recharacterized) lender.
Presumably the $80 difference between total dividends-$400 in
our example-and amount "loaned"-$320-would be allowed to
the stockholder-borrower as an interest deduction and included in
the income of the "lender" over the term of the "loan."
If sustainable, the loan characterization produces a better out-
come than the carved-out interest rule-from a national perspec-
tive, at least-because it taxes dividends when they are actually
paid. The Treasury really has no plausible interest in collecting an
ordinary dividend tax prior to the time of actual distribution, and it
is only the vagaries of tax accounting that leads to a tax on $320 in
Year 1. On the other hand, absent the form of a borrowing, the
loan characterization may be difficult to achieve through judicial
construction. In Estate of Stranahan,14 for example, the taxpayer,
having excess personal deduction in Year 1, sold a carved-out divi-
dend right to his son in an effort to anticipate ordinary income
against which the excess deductions could be used. Opposing this
result, the government sought to recharacterize the sale as a loan,
in which event the dividends (net of discount) would have been
imputed to the taxpayer ratably as the "loan" was repaid. The
Court of Appeals rejected the government's position and held that
the entire proceeds were includable in the year of sale. The
Court's reasoning, quite simply, was that since the vendee's ulti-
14. Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
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mate collections were uncertain-future dividends might exceed or
fall short of expectations-the transaction lacked the fixed-obli-
gation feature of a true loan and could not be treated as such by
mere assertion. 15
Still another route to ratable inclusion of carved-out income
rights exists, and it is one that may well be superior-theoretically,
at least-to either the lump-sum inclusion rule of Stranahan or the
Commissioner's unsuccessful loan characterization. The approach is
suggested (but not supported in this context) by § 1232(b), which
requires the purchaser of a bond issued at a discount to include the
discount in income ratably as the bond moves towards maturity.
The very same approach could be taken to the "stripped remain-
der" that is left in the hands of the stockholder after the carved-out
dividend right is sold off. The value of the stockholder's remainder
is then (in our example) $1,000 less the $320 value of the dividend
right, or $680. As the 5-year period elaspes, the remainder in-
creases from $680 to $1,000, everything else being equal, and it
would be entirely appropriate to impute income to the stockholder
at the rate of $64 a year ($320/5). Together with the vendee's an-
nual income of $16, the yearly income taxable to both parties is the
correct sum of $80, and the inclusion takes place on a year-by-year
basis as dividends are paid. The ordinary tax is thus imposed on
the annual increase in the net worth of each party, and both the
revenues and the individuals' taxable incomes are in this respect at
the right level.
The difficulty is that the tax law has traditionally lacked the ca-
pacity to tax the increase in value of a remainder resulting from the
passage of time or to impute taxable interest to the annual increase
in the value of discount obligations. Sections 1232(b) and (c) do
pick up discount in a limited class of cases-where corporate bonds
are originally issued at less than face or are sold with interest cou-
pons detached-but in situations not explicitly covered by the stat-
ute, imputation is unlikely to be accomplished by judicial construc-
tion.16 The reason no doubt is a practical one (unless attributed to
mere economic ignorance): the proper rate of imputation, or dis-
count, that would be appropriate in a given case may be uncertain,
and the absence of an actual cash receipt with which to pay the
taxes due makes it difficult to insist on the mere principle of impu-
15. Id. at 871.
16. See United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 & n.4 (1965).
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tation. For this and other reasons, interest imputation has gener-
ally been beyond the reach of a court applying § 61 without aid of
other more explicit statutory provisions, so that the taxation of
stripped remainders is simply not a result that is likely to be
achieved by unaided interpretation. The existing carved-out inter-
est rule-which has the strength, but also the weakness, of taxing
the receipt of cash-represents a clumsy but apparently a neces-
sary substitute.
As a further note at this stage, it is also easy to see why the
carved-out interest rule needs to be applied more stringently in
the capital gain area than it does in the income-attribution field
(where the fruit-tree formulation originated). In early cases like
Helvering v. Horst17 and Harrison v. Schaffner,'8 the Supreme
Court held that the gratuitous assignment of a short-term income
right-in Horst, two-years' coupons detached from a bond-would
be ineffective to shift tax to the donee. Such income would be re-
garded, in effect, as belonging to the donor despite the assignment
and despite the receipt of actual cash by the donee. The reason for
the rule, one supposes, was that the Court feared a large-scale eva-
sion of the progressive rates: property-owners could, through short-
term gifts of income, pick and choose among family members
(including family trusts) depending on where the marginal tax rate
was the lowest, and in that way defeat or impair the graduated rate
structure.
The latter concern led naturally and properly to a dividing-
line-principle-now reflected in the 10-year rule of § 673. If the
transferred income-interest exceeds 10 years in term, then the tax
shifts to the donee despite the element of carving out. Presumably,
10 years is a long enough period to deprive the donor of any real
ability to manipulate the income flow from the affected property,
and thus the graduated rate structure is adequately defended.
Moreover, the present value of a 10-year income ,interest is likely
to be greater than that of the reversion retained by the donor, so
that, using an "ownership" criterion, the donee may well appear to
have the larger interest in the property.
In the capital gain field, by contrast, no time dividing-line lim-
itation can be accepted. Given the vendee's right to amortize his
cost for the acquired interest, it becomes imperative to tax at ordi-
17. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
18. 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
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nary rates the entire proceeds of sale. No matter how long the
term of the interest sold, the proceeds must be treated as ordinary
income to the seller. A rule that allowed an offset of basis and/or
capital gain on the sale of long-term rights would reduce the ordi-
nary income base below the appropriate level and hence would
simply extend the mischief which the carved-out interest limitation
is designed to prevent.
Precisely this mistake was made by Congress when it adopted
§ 1001(e), a provision whose aim was to correct the error made by
the Second Circuit in the well-known McAllister case. 19 In
McAllister, the court held that the seller of a life estate was enti-
tled both to offset her basis for the interest sold against the pro-
ceeds of sale and to treat any gain or loss as capital gain or loss.
The effect-given the right of the remainderman to the full basis of
the trust property on expiration of the life estate-was to allow an
overcounting of basis and to permit a substantial portion of the fu-
ture income from the trust to be wiped out entirely. Section
1001(e) restores that income by denying the life tenant a basis for
the life estate; but it fails to classify the life estate as a non-capital
asset and thus in effect permits the net yield from the trust prop-
erty to escape the ordinary tax base and to be treated as capital
gain. Capital gain treatment in this context is presumably to be ex-
plained on the ground that sellers of life estates will receive a sub-
stantial amount of future income in a single year; this, in turn, cre-
ates a "bunched" income problem and hence a need for averaging
relief of some kind. The result, however, is to impair the ordinary
income base by transferring net yield into the capital gain category,
and if viewed from that perspective, the outcome under § 1001(e)
is flatly incorrect.
One final observation can be made (before attempting to apply
the ideas sketched out above to lease and loan terminations specifi-
cally). Although the carved-out interest rule apparently applies to
depreciable property (machines, buildings, patents, etc.) and to
non-depreciable property (stocks, bonds, unimproved land) alike,
there is actually little or no need for such a rule in the case of de-
preciable assets. If the underlying property is a wasting asset, the
act of carving out a short-term interest-drawing a shorter out of a
longer "annuity"-presents no threat to the ordinary tax base and




could, without harm, be treated in accordance with the usual capi-
tal gain and basis-offset rules-those that apply where property is
sold in its entirety. The reason, obviously, is that no new right of
amortization has been created by the carving-out. The original
owner of the property having been entitled to depreciate his in-
vestment, his vendee can do no more. Putting it another way,
there is no reason to apply a different rule when a term interest in
depreciable property is sold than when the entire property is sold,
because the two transactions have an equivalent impact on the or-
dinary tax base. Hence, where tangible property is concerned,
temporal and vertical dispositions (sale of a term interest and sale
of an undivided interest) are in theory the same.
The result of applying the carved-out interest rule to sales of
term interests in depreciable property is simply to require the tax-
payer to anticipate income by separating the advance payment
from the related depreciation allowance. In effect, the proceeds of
the carving-out are reported currently; the related depreciation,
however, is not permitted to be anticipated under tax accounting
rules, and the opportunity for capital gain (where the prepayment
would exceed the present value of related depreciation) is lost.
Wrong in theory, these outcomes are nevertheless readily avoided
by engaging in loan transactions rather than sales. An owner of
depreciable property can obviously raise funds by borrowing-
assigning the property as collateral-without any present tax
consequences. Properly advised, no one would seek the same end
by sale of a carved-out interest, and at least since the hey-day of
the oil-production deals which culminated in the Lake case, no
doubt very few have.
III. LEASE AND LOAN TERMINATIONS
The discussion to this point has attempted to establish two
ideas:
First: Insofar as property investment is concerned, the ordi-
nary income base must include the net yield from investment in
tangible property-typically, interest and dividends. By contrast, if
a change occurs in anticipated yield-whether because of an in-
crease in expected cash flows or because of a decline in rate of
discount-that change is entitled to be capitalized by the owner of
the property through sale or other form of realization. And the re-




Second: The carved-out interest rule plays an indispensable
role in protecting the ordinary income base from being under-
stated. Absent the rule, holders of financial assets would be in a
position to convert ordinary income into capital gain by conveying
an amortizable term interest to another investor-in effect, by
carving an annuity out of a perpetuity. The carved-out interest
rules prevents this distortion (even if rather clumsily) by denying
the stock or bond owner a basis for the term interest and by
treating the proceeds of sale as ordinary.
Again by contrast, the limitation on carving out should have
no application where the effect of a transaction is simply to adjust
the present value of an income-stream-where, in other words, the
transaction serves merely to reduce the amount includable in the
ordinary tax base to an appropriate current level. In the latter
event, capital gain, plus a stepped-up basis for depreciation or
amortization, is the correct set of outcomes.
From this vantage point it may be possible to say something
useful about two related transactions-lease and loan cancellations
-whose contrasting tax treatment under the decided cases repre-
sents a long-standing puzzle. A change in expected rate of
return-whether of rentals on real estate or of interest on
borrowings--necessarily affects the values of existing contractual
commitments, whether leases or bonds. If sufficiently dramatic,
such a change may induce one of the parties to propose a termina-
tion of the commitment in exchange for a cash payment. For tax
purposes, the question is how such a payment, if accepted, should
be treated by the payee. Is it gain from the sale of a capital asset
(the lease or bond), or just a substitute for the ordinary income
which the payee would have received had the contract been
carried out to completion?
In the famous Hort case, the Supreme Court held that a cash
payment received by a lessor from a lessee on the cancellation of a
lease was ordinary income to the lessor. The taxpayer argued that
the lease-cancellation had resulted in a loss-rental-values having
fallen substantially as a result of the Depression-or, in the al-
ternative, that the lease itself should be viewed as a capital asset,
with the cash payment therefore being capital gain. The Court re-
jected both arguments. Finding that the cash payment was merely
a lump-sum substitute for future rents, and holding that no sepa-
rate basis could be allocated to the leasehold, the Court sustained




The result in Hort-which involved a payment by a lessee to a
lessor--can be contrasted with the results in cases where rents rise
during the term of an existing lease and the lease grows onerous to
the lessor. If the lessor makes a cash payment to his lessee in ex-
change for a cancellation of the lease, the courts uniformly hold
that the lessee thereby realizes capital gain, the lease being
treated in the lessee's hands as a capital asset. 20 The benefit to the
lessee-namely, the difference between the rentals called for by
the existing lease and the higher rents that could be anticipated if a
new lease were entered into-plainly represents a substitute for fu-
ture income, but the reasoning of the Hort decision is largely dis-
regarded when the transaction is "reversed" and there is no dissent
from the proposition that a cancellation payment to a lessee is capi-
tal gain.
Where the subject matter of the original contract is money
rather than real estate or other tangible property, the tax results of
cancellation payments are exactly opposite to those just described.
Thus, if bonds are retired at a premium, the lender has a capital
gain. 21 Here, of course, it may be assumed that interest rates have
declined since the bond was issued. By contrast, if bonds are re-
tired at a discount-interest rates having risen-the issuer-bor-
rower has ordinary income. The latter conclusion is a settled infer-
ence from U.S. v. Kirby Lumber Co. ,22 in which the repurchase of
outstanding debentures at a discount from face led to debt-
forgiveness income to the corporation. While the capital-ordinary
distinction was not at issue in the Kirby case, it has long been ac-
cepted that forgiveness income is ordinary on the ground that the
loan contract is not a capital asset from the debtor's standpoint or
that debt retirement is not a "sale or exchange."23
20. Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954); Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.- 939 (1953).
21. I.R.C. § 1232(a).
22. 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
23. Rev. Rul. 69-613, 1969-2 C.B. 163. Ordinary treatment may also be ex-
plained as a kind of informal recapture rule. Assuming the original loan proceeds
were used to pay current expenses or to purchase depreciable assets, their expendi-
ture will have resulted in ordinary business deductions for the borrower. Arguably,
the "related" forgiveness income should be ordinary as well. On the other hand, or-
dinary treatment would be imposed even if the loan proceeds could be traced into
capital assets or into real estate that is depreciable on a straight-line basis-property
normally not affected by recapture-so that the link-up, if any, is not systematic. H.R.
5043, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), the so-called Bankruptcy Tax Act, does tend to
stress the relationship between debt forgiveness and recapture, however, by re-
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Equating lessor with lender, and lessee with borrower, it is
evident that the two sets of results are inconsistent. A fall in rents
produces ordinary income to a lessor, while a fall in interest rates
produces capital gain to a bondholder. A rise in rents produces
capital gain to a lessee, but a rise in interest rates produces ordi-
nary income to a bond-issuer. Since lessor-and-lender, and lessee-
and-borrower, are perfectly matched pairs from an economic point
of view, the obvious questions is: Why should the tax outcomes dif-
fer depending on whether it is a lease or a loan that is being
cancelled or retired?
The answer usually given-as Professor Andrews has noted
2 -
is that lessors and borrowers are thought to be engaged in a
carving-out, while lessees and lenders are seen as disposing of their
"entire property." In the case of a lessor (Hort), we apparently
identify the fee interest in the real estate as the relevant "underly-
ing property," and plainly that has not been disposed of when the
lease is cancelled. Hence, a carving-out occurs. But where a lender
is concerned, the underlying property is the bond that he
owns-not the funds it represents and certainly not the investment
portfolio of which it is a part. If the bond is retired at a premium,
then a disposition of "the property" occurs and there is no carving
out. From the standpoint of a lessee, similarly, the only "property"
is assumed to be the lease itself (not, for example, the lessee's
larger operating business), so that cancellation is viewed as a dispo-
sition of the property in its entirety. But where a borrower is con-
cerned, while the carved-out interest rule is not usually invoked in
terms, ordinary income results for a reason that is roughly analo-
gous, namely, that debt-retirement is not deemed a "sale or ex-
change" from the debtor's standpoint.
All this is obviously mere semantics. If one focuses on the or-
dinary income base-that is, the net yield from investment in tan-
gible property-rather than seeking metaphoric distinctions be-
tween fruit and tree, the right results are reasonably clear. In fact,
all four cases are entitled to be treated as capital transactions; les-
sors and borrowers, no less than lessees and lenders, are entitled
to treat the premiums they realize on termination of their contracts
as capital gains. The reason has already been given: in effect, the
quiring that in the case of an elective exclusion of forgiveness income under I.R.C. §
108 only the basis of depreciable property shall be reduced under the corollary §
1017.
24. W. ANDREws, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 902 (2d ed. 1979).
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Treasury's only legitimate interest is in taxing at ordinary rates the
current yield from investment in tangible property. Property yields
obviously change from time to time, either for reasons that are spe-
cific to the firm or, more often, because of overall changes in the
economy. Private investors do of course make long-term contracts
that contain promised rates of return which reflect their expec-
tations at the time the contracts are entered into. But such con-
tracts, though binding on the parties, have no effect on true rates
of return and are not made for the benefit of the Treasury. If the
market rate departs from the contractual rate (in either direction),
then a windfall develops for the party in whose favor the market
has moved and a penalty results to the other. Once more, this is a
matter for the parties to rejoice or sorrow over, but it has nothing
to do with the Treasury.
If, in these circumstances, the parties elect to terminate their
contract for a cash payment, the amount so paid is simply the price
of adjusting the contract-value of the income-stream up or down to
market value and as such it belongs outside the ordinary income
base. The carved-out interest rule, of which the larger object is to
protect the ordinary tax base, need have no application whatever.
Lessors and borrowers are just as much "investors" as lessees and
lenders: in every case, the "underlying property" is the parties'
contractual commitment, and the right result for all parties is capi-
tal gain.
25
In my view, it would be correct and consistent for Congress to
amend the Code so as to extend capital gain treatment to both
Hort and Kirby-type taxpayers. The amendment-presumably to
present § 1241-would simply provide that all lease cancellation
premiums, whether paid to lessees or lessors, and all bond re-
demption gains, whether realized by lenders or borrowers, will be
regarded as arising from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. In
25. Perhaps this point needs special emphasis in regard to borrowers. While
one who contracts a debt is not usually thought of as an "investor" speculating on
market movements, realistically a corporation that issues bonds in exchange for capi-
tal funds is simply taking a "short" position in its own securities. If interest rates
rise, the issuer may choose to close that position out and realize its gain by
repurchasing its bonds at a discount from the issue price. If the same corporation had
chosen to raise funds by short-selling the bonds of another company, and then, after
interest rates had risen, had bought those bonds at a discount for delivery to purchas-
ers, the "investment" nature of its gain would be apparent. No reason exists for
treating the matter differently merely because the taxpayer deals in its own bonds
rather than those of an unrelated concern.
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the case of lease premiums, where, as in Hort, the lessor owns the
underlying reversion, it would probably be simpler to treat the en-
tire premium as gain rather than attempt to allocate some portion
of the lessor's basis to the lease. In the case of bond redemptions,
the measure of gain is obviously the difference between the origi-
nal loan proceeds and the lower redemption price.
But would a Code amendment along these lines make any real
difference in the present climate of affairs? Is it worth the trouble,
from a practical standpoint, to alter rules of such long standing? As
to Hort-type taxpayers-lessors accepting premiums to cancel over-
valued leases-the answer is only marginally affirmative. In an era
of rising rents, lease cancellations, when they do occur, would al-
most always run in favor of lessees, who are assured capital gain in
any event by both § 1241 and the decided cases.
On the other hand, capital gain for Kirby-type taxpayers-
for the most part corporations retiring outstanding bonds at a dis-
count from face-would be likely to have considerable practical im-
portance at present. With interest rates having risen so sharply
over the past few years, many corporate bonds have recently been
quoted at very substantial discounts in the market and hence in
economic terms present a tempting target for retirement. In these
circumstances, it may be that capital treatment for bond redemp-
tion gains would offer more encouragement to corporate treasurers
who contemplate the early retirement of outstanding debt than the
present combination of ordinary income under § 61(a)(12) and
elective deferral under §§ 108 and 1017 26-especially if the issuer
has offsetting capital losses from other sources. Hence, if the Code
were amended as proposed, the pace of such retirements might be
expected to increase.
In one important respect any such trend toward the speedier
redemption of discounted bonds would actually be favorable to the
revenues-and to tax equity. Thus, although the Code now taxes
original issue discount to bond investors at ordinary rates, § 1232(a)
explicitly extends capital gain treatment to investors who purchase,
and who simply hold to maturity, bonds which have fallen to a dis-
26. Forgiveness of indebtedness generally results in income to the debtor.
I.R.C. § 108 provides that the taxpayer may exclude this amount if the indebtedness
was incurred or assumed by a corporation or by an individual in connection with
property used in his trade or business. The taxpayer can exclude this income but




count because of a rise in interest rates. Yet it is perfectly plain
that high-bracket individuals who invest in "deep-discount bonds"
are thereby in effect converting ordinary interest income into capi-
tal gain. For practical reasons, nothing can be done about this di-
rectly; but in principle capital gain in this context is indefensible.
"Thus, when interest rates have risen, rich men buy bonds at a
discount from poor men so that part of the bond's true interest will
appear as a so-called capital gain that is lightly taxed. Such a tax
swap involves the purchase by the rich of the low tax base of the
poor, at the expense of the government. "27 If the taxation of bond
redemption gains were corrected-and if, as suggested, corporate
issuers were thereby prompted to retire discounted debt before
maturity-the opportunities to obtain unwarranted individual tax
benefits through the purchase of discount bonds would become less
abundant, with a consequent gain in equity and fairness.
CONCLUSION
My effort in this discussion has been to relate the familiar
carved-out interest rule to the ordinary income base and to show
how important the former is in protecting the latter. This, how-
ever, leads to the observation that in two major applications of the
carved-out interest doctrine-the Hort and the Kirby Lumber deci-
sions (the latter in its ordinary income aspect)-the Court was in
fact misguided, and that capital gain treatment would be proper
both for lessors' premiums and for borrowers' redemption gains.
Finally, I have suggested that any change in the tax rules that en-
courages issuers to advance the retirement of discounted bonds will
tend to reduce the ability of high-bracket investors to turn interest
income into capital gain, a matter of no little importance at the
present writing.
27. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invari-
ant Valuations, 72 J. POL. ECON. 604, 606 (1964).
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